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OPSOMMING 
Die slagggate van internasionale surrogaatmoederskap:  
’n Suid-Afrikaanse perspektief 
ƌ Regsvraag wat dikwels in die geval van internasionale surrogaatmoederskap opduik, is 
na wie regtens die kind se ouers is. In Suid-Afrika laat die Kinderwet 38 van 2005 
altruïstiese surrogaatmoederskap toe en verleen die reg erkenning aan die gevolge van ’n 
surrogaatmoederskapsooreenkoms wat deur die Hoë Hof bekragtig is. Behalwe dat die 
Kinderwet poog om internasionale surrogaatmoederskap te beperk deur te vereis dat die 
surrogaatmoederskapsooreenkoms in Suid-Afrika onderteken moet word deur partye wat 
in Suid-Afrika gedomisilieerd is, swyg die Wet oor internasionale surrogaatmoederskap 
en die regsgevolge daarvan. Verder reël nóg die Kinderwet, nóg enige ander wet, die 
gevolge indien Suid-Afrikaners na die buiteland gaan om daar ’n kind deur middel van 
surrogaatmoederskap te bekom. Laasgenoemde situasie word tans deur die reëls van die 
internasionale privaatreg gereguleer en aan die howe oorgelaat. Die hoofoogmerk van die 
artikel is om die posisie te bespreek indien persone wat nie in Suid-Afrika gedomisilieerd 
is nie, deur middel van surrogaatmoederskap ’n kind in Suid-Afrika bekom, en indien 
Suid-Afrikaners deur middel van surrogaatmoederskap ’n kind in die buiteland bekom. 
Die bespreking fokus op familieregkwessies, en in die besonder op die vraag wie regtens 
die kind se ouer is. Sommige wyses waarop Suid-Afrika die probleme wat uit bo-
genoemde gevalle van internasionale surrogaatmoederskap ontstaan, kan aanspreek, word 
kortliks oorweeg. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
International surrogacy,1 or cross-border surrogacy as it is sometimes called,2 is a 
very topical issue. A spate of academic contributions has been published recently 
________________________ 
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 1 International surrogacy refers to surrogacy involving parties from more than one country. 
One can think of all manner of complicated permutations of international surrogacy, eg, the 
commissioning parents might be from Country A, the surrogate mother from Country B, 
the ovum donor from Country C and the sperm donor from Country D, the surrogate mother-
hood agreement might be signed in Country E, the implantation of the embryo in the sur-
rogate mother might take place in Country F, and the birth might take place in Country G. 
For purposes of this article, the much simpler scenario of only two countries, one of which 
is South Africa, is used and it is assumed that the commissioning parent(s) and gamete  
donor(s) (if any) all have the same country of origin, that the artificial fertilisation of the 
continued on next page 
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on the topic,3 at least three international or transnational bodies are in the process 
of investigating international surrogacy or have recently published reports 
resulting from their investigations,4 and in several countries cases involving 
international surrogacy have ended up in court.5 In South Africa, however, 
________________________ 
surrogate mother or the implantation of the embryo in her occurred in her country of origin, 
and that the birth also occurred in the country of origin of the surrogate mother.  
 2 Strictly speaking, “cross-border surrogacy” is broader than “international surrogacy” as it 
refers not only to surrogacy across national borders but also to surrogacy across the borders 
of various states, provinces or territories within a single country where surrogacy is regu-
lated by different statutes that operate at local level (eg the United States of America, Can-
ada and Australia). In this article, the term “international surrogacy” is used since the 
article adopts a South African perspective and, in this country, surrogacy is governed at 
national level. 
 3 To cite but a small sample of the international academic literature published since 2013: 
Trimmings and Beaumont (eds) International surrogacy arrangements: Legal regulation at 
the international level (2013); Henaghan “International surrogacy trends: How family law is 
coping” 2013 Australian J of Adoption 1; Nelson “Global trade and assisted reproductive 
technologies: Regulatory challenges in international surrogacy” 2013 The J of L, Medicine & 
Ethics 240; Crockin “Growing families in a shrinking world: Legal and ethical challenges in 
cross-border surrogacy” 2013 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 733; Lin “Born lost: State-
less children in international surrogacy arrangements” 2013 Cardozo J of Int and Comp L 
545; Knoche 2014 Int J of Gynecology and Obstetrics 183; Tobin “To prohibit or permit: 
What is the (human) rights response to the practice of international commercial surrogacy?” 
2014 ICLQ 317; Van Beers “Is Europe ‘giving in to baby markets?’ Reproductive tourism in 
Europe and the gradual erosion of existing legal limits to reproductive markets” 2014 Medical 
LR 1; Bromfield and Rotabi “Global surrogacy, exploitation, human rights and international 
private law: A pragmatic stance and policy recommendations” July 2014 Global Social Wel-
fare (online) http://bit.ly/1zAY7eW (accessed 6 July 2014). 
 4 The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law submitted its 
Preliminary report on the issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements (Prelim-
inary Document 10 of March 2012) (hereafter Permanent Bureau Preliminary report) to the 
Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
in 2012 and released two provisional editions of preliminary documents emanating from its 
study in March 2014: Preliminary Document 3B of March 2014 The desirability and feasibil-
ity of further work on the parentage/surrogacy project (hereafter Permanent Bureau Prelimin-
ary Document 3B) and Preliminary Document 3C of March 2014 A study of legal parentage 
and the issues arising from international surrogacy agreements (hereafter Permanent Bureau 
Preliminary Document 3C). The Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament 
commissioned a study on surrogacy in the European Union, which was authored by Brunet et 
al A comparative study of the regime of surrogacy in EU member states PE 474.403 (2013). 
Finally, the Family Law Committee of the International Law Association prepared a Report 
on international surrogacy, 2012, which was submitted for approval at the 76th Biennial ILA 
Conference in Washington DC, United States of America in April 2014.  
 5 On the burgeoning case law, see eg Brunet et al 72–136 and the sections on case law in  
the various country reports in the document; Malhotra and Malhotra “Law and surrogacy  
arrangements in India” in Atkin (ed) Int Survey of Family L 2013 Edition (2013) (hereafter 
Malhotra and Malhotra Int Survey) 151; Gamble “Crossing the line: The legal and ethical 
problems of foreign surrogacy” 2009 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 151; Storrow “As-
sisted reproduction on treacherous terrain: The legal hazards of cross-border reproductive 
travel” 2011 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 540–543; Carnelley “Ex parte WH 2011 6 
SA 514 (GNP)” 2012 De Jure 187–188; Mohapatra “Stateless babies & adoption scams:  
A bioethical analysis of international surrogacy” 2012 Berkeley J of Int L 417–421;  
Mortazavi “It takes a village to make a child: Creating guidelines for international surrog-
acy” 2012 Georgetown LJ 2274–2277; Malhotra and Malhotra “All aboard for the fertility 
express” 2012 Commonwealth L Bulletin 32–34; Henaghan 2013 Australian J of Adoption  
5–12; Lin 2013 Cardozo J of Int and Comp L 570–579; Wolf “Why Japan should legalize 
surrogacy” 2014 Pacific Rim L and Policy J 472–477. 
26 2015 (78) THRHR
 
26 
international surrogacy has not yet received much academic or judicial atten-
tion.6  
The growing interest in international surrogacy probably is due partly to the 
increased incidence of international surrogacy7 and partly to the contentious 
nature of international surrogacy and surrogacy in general. Surrogacy (particularly, 
commercial surrogacy)8 is an issue that gives rise to many cultural, moral, 
ethical, medical and legal concerns, including the commodification of, and crea-
tion of a market for children; the exploitation, degradation and commodification 
of surrogate mothers; uncertainty as to who the child’s parents are; the risks 
associated with ovulation induction treatment of the surrogate mother and/or the 
ovum donor; the unanticipated surge of love a surrogate mother might experi-
ence for the child, making it difficult for her to give up the child; and the possi-
bility of the commissioning parents9 changing their mind about proceeding with 
the surrogacy after the surrogate mother has fallen pregnant.10 
Of course, there are also arguments in favour of surrogacy. They include  
allowing a woman to exercise her reproductive rights as she sees fit; enabling 
infertile persons to obtain a child who is genetically related to them; and giving 
childless persons the joy of raising a child.11  
________________________ 
 6 Apart from a recent Master’s dissertation on the topic (Groenewald Internasionale 
regulering van surrogaatmoederskap (LLM dissertation North-West University 2014), 
academic discussions with a specifically South African focus have tended to be brief: see 
Oppong Private international law in Commonwealth Africa (2013) 233–234; Slabbert and 
Roodt “South Africa” in Trimmings and Beaumont (eds) (hereafter Slabbert and Roodt) 
342–344; Nöthling-Slabbert “Legal issues relating to the use of surrogate mothers in the 
practice of assisted conception” 2012 SAJBL 27 31; Bonthuys and Broeders “Guidelines 
for the approval of surrogate motherhood agreements: Ex parte WH” 2013 SALJ 493–494; 
Louw “Surrogacy in South Africa: Should we reconsider the current approach?” 2013 
THRHR 585–588. Ex parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP) is the only reported South African 
decision that (briefly) touches on international surrogacy. 
 7 For statistics on international surrogacy arrangements, see Permanent Bureau Preliminary 
report 8 and Preliminary Document 3C paras 125–129; Nelson 2013 The J of L, Medicine 
& Ethics 241; Nicholson “When moral outrage determines a legal response: Surrogacy as 
labour” 2013 SAJHR 497–498; Knoche 2014 Int J of Gynecology and Obstetrics 183–184. 
 8 In the case of commercial surrogacy, the surrogate mother uses the surrogacy for financial 
gain. In the case of altruistic surrogacy, she does not undertake the surrogacy primarily for 
financial gain. In either case, the surrogacy can be either gestational (full) or traditional 
(partial). Gestational surrogacy occurs when a surrogate mother carries a foetus which is 
genetically unrelated to her because it is the product of fertilisation of a donor ovum with 
donor sperm (eg the ovum of the commissioning mother and the commissioning father). 
Traditional surrogacy occurs when the foetus the surrogate mother carries is genetically 
related to her because it is the product of fertilisation of the surrogate mother’s ovum with 
donor sperm: see eg Louw in Davel and Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 
(2007) (hereafter Louw Commentary) 19–3; Knoche “Health concerns and ethical consid-
erations regarding international surrogacy” 2014 Int J of Gynecology and Obstetrics 183. 
 9 Commissioning parents are called “intended parents” or “intending parents” in some 
countries. 
 10 The commissioning parents may change their mind because they have separated or are 
getting divorced, or because prenatal medical examinations have shown that the child will 
be handicapped: see eg Baby Manji Yamada v Union of India (UOI) AIR2009 SC 84 29 
September 2008. 
 11 On these and other arguments for and against surrogacy, including international surrogacy, 
see Kruger and Skelton (eds) The law of persons in South Africa (2010) 94–95; Schäfer 
Child law in South Africa. Domestic and international perspectives (2011) 263–264;  
continued on next page 
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In the case of international surrogacy, additional concerns and problems arise. 
They include cultural, moral, ethical and religious differences in perspectives on 
surrogacy and the parent-child relationship. Legal problems frequently arise, 
especially if the rules of the commissioning parents’ country of origin12 differ 
from those of the foreign country where the child was born. These problems are 
compounded if the commissioning parents’ country of origin does not recognise 
surrogacy at all,13 or if it does not recognise surrogacy in the circumstances in 
which it occurred in the foreign country (for example, if the surrogacy was com-
mercial or if the commissioning parents are of the same sex and their country of 
origin does not recognise same-sex relationships and/or does not permit same-
sex couples to obtain a child via surrogacy).14  
One of the legal questions which arise most frequently is who the child’s legal 
parents are. The issue of legal parentage has implications for the registration of 
the child’s birth, since the particulars of the child’s parents must be indicated 
when the birth is registered. Further, because a child’s citizenship is usually 
based on place of birth and/or citizenship of the child’s parent, recognition of a 
particular person as a child’s legal parent has implications for the child’s ability 
to become a citizen of a particular country. And, as a person’s ability to obtain 
travel documents from a particular country’s authorities depends on whether the 
person is a citizen of that country, recognition of a particular person as a child’s 
legal parent also affects the child’s ability to obtain documentation to enable him 
________________________ 
Groenewald 36–40; Permanent Bureau Preliminary report 4–5; South African Law Com-
mission Report on surrogate motherhood (Project 65) (1993) (hereafter SALC Report)  
10–29; Meyerson “Surrogacy agreements” in Murray (ed) Gender and the new South Afri-
can legal order (1994) (hereafter Meyerson Gender) 123–134; Mortazavi 2012 George-
town LJ 2282–2284; Mohapatra 2012 Berkeley J of Int L 437–448; Nicholson 2013 SAJHR 
497 499 502–508 509–514; Henaghan 2013 Australian J of Adoption 12–14 18; Crockin 
2013 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 737–739; Nelson 2013 The J of L, Medicine & 
Ethics 245 247–248; Lin 2013 Cardozo J of Int and Comp L 551–552; Knoche 2014 Int J 
of Gynaecology and Obstetrics 184–185; Agnafors “The harm argument against surrogacy 
revisited: Two versions not to forget” 2014 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 357ff; 
Margalit “In defense of surrogacy agreements: A modern contract law perspective” 2014 
William and Mary J of Women and the L 430ff; Bromfield and Rotabi July 2014 Global 
Social Welfare (online). 
 12 In this article, the term “country of origin” refers to the country where the commissioning 
parents normally/habitually reside and to which they want to return after the child’s birth.  
 13 These countries include Austria (§§ 2 and 3 of the Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz); Germany 
(§ 1(1), (2), (6) and (7) of the Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen/Embryonenschutzgesetz; 
§ 13 of the Gesetz über die Vermittlung der Annahme als Kind und über das Verbot der 
Vermittlung von Ersatzmüttern/Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz); Switzerland (§ 4 of the Fort-
pflanzungsmedizingesetz); and Turkey (Legislation Concerning Assisted Reproduction 
Treatment Practices and Centres as set out by Gürtin “Banning reproductive travel:  
Turkey’s ART legislation and third-party assisted reproduction” 2011 Reproductive Bio-
Medicine Online 555 556). 
 14 Most countries which permit surrogacy allow only altruistic surrogacy and prohibit and 
criminalise commercial surrogacy. They include South Africa (see para 2 below); Canada 
(Assisted Human Reproduction Act, s 6); and Greece (Greek Civil Code a 1458 as amended 
by the Medically Assisted Human Reproduction Law 3089/2002 (English translation at 
http://bit.ly/1rkOZX5, accessed 6 July 2014). Commercial surrogacy is allowed in, inter 
alia, India and Ukraine. See eg Permanent Bureau Preliminary report 16; Mohapatra 2012 
Berkeley J of Int L 432–433; Henaghan 2013 Australian J of Adoption 2; Lin 2013 
Cardozo J of Int and Comp L 552.  
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or her to gain entry into the commissioning parents’ country of origin after birth 
in the foreign country.15 Conflicting rules in the various jurisdictions may, in the 
worst case scenario, result in the child being parentless and stateless and the 
commissioning parents being unable to take the child to their country of origin. 
Even if the commissioning parents succeed in this, they may not be recognised 
as the child’s legal parents in that country.  
In South Africa, the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 allows altruistic surrogacy and 
recognises the consequences of a surrogate motherhood agreement that has been 
confirmed by the High Court. Except to the extent that the Act seeks to limit 
international surrogacy by requiring that the surrogate motherhood agreement 
must be signed in South Africa by parties who are domiciled in this country,16 it 
is silent on international surrogacy and its consequences. Unfortunately, there is 
no public or private international law instrument on international surrogacy we 
can turn to for guidance either.17 
The main objective of this article is to discuss the legal position which oper-
ates if: 
(a) persons who are not domiciled in South Africa obtain a child via surrogacy 
in this country; and  
(b) South Africans18 obtain a child via surrogacy in a foreign country.  
First, the provisions of the Children’s Act which regulate surrogacy are set out. 
The discussion focuses on those provisions which could be pertinent in the 
context of international surrogacy because they dictate the consequences of 
surrogacy, may encourage South Africans to engage in surrogacy abroad or 
discourage foreigners from engaging in surrogacy in South Africa, and indicate 
the South African legislature’s distaste for commercial surrogacy. Then, the 
consequences of the two instances of international surrogacy identified above are 
examined. The discussion focuses on family law issues and, in particular, legal 
parentage of the child from a private law perspective. Some public law matters 
that are linked to legal parentage are mentioned in brief. In the second-last part 
of the article possible methods for regulating the identified instances of interna-
tional surrogacy are considered briefly. A detailed evaluation of the advantages 
and disadvantages of each of the methods is impossible due to length restrictions. 
As is customary, the article ends with a conclusion.  
Although the article is not primarily comparative in nature, foreign law is  
occasionally referred to. 
________________________ 
 15 See eg Henaghan 2013 Australian J of Adoption 4.  
 16 This requirement is discussed in para 2 below. 
 17 Although no public international law instrument expressly deals with surrogacy, some 
instruments (eg the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)) are relevant in the 
context of international surrogacy. See further Groenewald 46–48 57–59; Stark “Trans-
national surrogacy and international human rights law” 2012 ILSA J of Int and Comp L 1; 
Stehr “International surrogacy contract regulation: National governments’ and international 
bodies’ misguided quests to prevent exploitation” 2012 Hastings Int and Comp LR  
280–284; Tobin 2014 ICLQ 317; Bromfield and Rotabi July 2014 Global Social Welfare 
(online). 
 18 In this article, persons who are domiciled or resident in South Africa or are South African 
citizens are lumped together under the loose term “South Africans”. 
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2 SURROGACY IN TERMS OF THE CHILDREN’S ACT19 
Before the coming into operation of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act on 1 April 
2010,20 surrogacy was not regulated by statute in South Africa. The Act expressly 
allows altruistic surrogacy and recognises its consequences, provided that the 
requirements imposed by the Act are met. Commercial surrogacy, in contrast, is 
prohibited and its consequences are not recognised. Below, the position in 
respect of altruistic surrogacy is dealt with first. Then, commercial surrogacy is 
discussed. 
2 1 Altruistic surrogacy 
The Children’s Act permits altruistic surrogacy provided that certain require-
ments are met. These requirements relate to the commissioning parents, the 
genetic origins of the child to be conceived, the surrogate mother, the surrogate 
motherhood agreement, and the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother. 
2 1 1 Commissioning parents, the genetic origins of the child, and the  
surrogate mother 
A single person, spouses, civil union partners, and life/permanent partners of the 
same or the opposite sex may be commissioning parent(s),21 but the surrogacy 
may only take place if the commissioning parent is, or the commissioning 
parents are, unable to give birth and the condition is permanent and irrevers-
ible.22 If the commissioning parent is single, his or her gamete (sperm or ovum) 
must be used for the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother.23 In the case 
of a commissioning couple the gametes of both commissioning parents must be 
used, unless this is impossible due to biological, medical or other valid reasons.24 
Other requirements are that the commissioning parent(s) must in all respects 
be suitable to accept parenthood and the surrogate mother must in all respects be 
________________________ 
 19 On surrogacy in terms of the Children’s Act, see also Boezaart Law of persons (2010) 
(hereafter Boezaart Persons) 97–98; Heaton The South African law of persons (2012) 
(hereafter Heaton Persons) 50–53; Kruger and Skelton (eds) 89–96; Schäfer ch 10;  
Louw Commentary ch 19; Slabbert and Roodt 325–346; Brunet et al 339–350; Groenewald 
5–34; Carnelley and Soni “Surrogate motherhood agreements” May 2011 De Rebus 30;  
Nöthling-Slabbert 2012 SAJBL 27; Nicholson and Bauling “Surrogate motherhood agree-
ments and their confirmation: A new challenge for practitioners?” 2013 De Jure 516–534;  
Nicholson 2013 SAJHR 499–502; Louw 2013 THRHR 564; Pillay and Zaal “Surrogate 
motherhood confirmation hearings: The advent of a fundamentally flawed process” 2013 
SALJ 465; Mahlobogwane “Surrogate motherhood arrangements in South Africa: Chang-
ing societal norms?” 2013(2) Speculum Juris 46–47 50–51 53 56. 
 20 Proc R12 GG 33076 of 1 April 2010. 
 21 S 1(1) of the Children’s Act defines a commissioning parent as “a person” who enters into 
a surrogate motherhood agreement with a surrogate mother. From ss 292(1)(c), 293(1) and 
294, read with s 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, one deduces that such “person” may 
be single, married, a party to a civil union, or a same-sex or opposite sex life partner/part-
ner in a permanent relationship. 
 22 S 295(a).  
 23 S 294. A single, divorced South African woman, whose anonymity is protected by a court 
order, initiated a legal challenge against this requirement in September 2013: Ghevaert 
“Challenge to South African surrogacy laws” http://bit.ly/1raqOwY (accessed 6 July 
2014); SAPA “Surrogacy law to be challenged in court” http://bit.ly/1q9Kbqt (accessed 
6 July 2014). The matter has not yet been heard. On the possible unconstitutionality of 
s 294, see Slabbert and Roodt 342.  
 24 S 294. 
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a suitable person to be a surrogate mother. The commissioning parents and surro-
gate mother must also understand and accept the legal consequences of the surro-
gate motherhood agreement and their rights and obligations under the agreement 
and the Children’s Act. The surrogate mother must have a documented history of 
at least one pregnancy and viable delivery, and she must have a living child of 
her own.25 
2 1 2 Surrogate motherhood agreement 
The parties must enter into a written surrogate motherhood agreement in South 
Africa.26 The agreement must be signed by all the parties27 and confirmed by the 
division of the High Court within which area of jurisdiction the commissioning 
parent or parents are domiciled or habitually resident.28 If the agreement is not 
confirmed, it is invalid.29 
The Act lists several requirements which must be satisfied before the court 
may confirm the agreement. One of them is that, having regard to the personal 
circumstances and family situations of all the parties, and above all the interests 
of the child who is to be born, the court must be satisfied that the agreement 
should be confirmed.30 
Most importantly for purposes of international surrogacy, the Act requires that 
the commissioning parents, or at least one of them, as well as the surrogate 
mother and her spouse, civil union partner or partner in a permanent relationship 
must be domiciled in South Africa when the parties enter into the agreement. If 
the commissioning parent is a single person, he or she must be domiciled in South 
Africa when the parties enter into the agreement.31 South African citizenship or 
(permanent) residence in South Africa does not, on its own, enable a person to 
become a commissioning parent or a surrogate mother in South Africa.32 
________________________ 
 25 S 295(b)(ii), (b)(iii), (c)(ii), (c)(iii), (c)(vi) and (c)(vii). 
 26 S 292(1)(b). 
 27 S 292(1)(a). If the commissioning parent or the surrogate mother is married or a party to a 
civil union or permanent relationship, his or her spouse, civil union partner or partner in the 
permanent relationship must give written consent to the agreement and become a party to 
it: s 293(1) and (2). The court may dispense with the latter consent if it is being unreason-
ably withheld and the husband, civil union partner or permanent partner is not the donor of 
genetic material that is to be used for the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother: 
s 293(3). 
 28 S 292(1)(e).  
 29 Ss 292(1)(e) and 297(2). 
 30 S 295(e). 
 31 S 292(1)(c)–(d). The Greek legislation on surrogacy contains similar restrictions as to 
domicile. S 8 of the Medically Assisted Human Reproduction Law 3089 of 2002 requires 
that the surrogate mother and the commissioning mother must be domiciled in Greece 
(English translation at http://bit.ly/1n1vpjc, accessed 6 July 2014). For a comparative study 
on Greek and South African surrogacy laws, see Brunet et al 345–350. South Australia also 
imposes a domicile requirement on commissioning parents: see the definition of “recog-
nised surrogacy agreement” in ss 10HA(2)(b)(iv) and 10HB(2)(b) of the Family Relation-
ships Act 1975 as amended by Statutes Amendment (Surrogacy) Act 2009. 
 32 Some countries or states restrict surrogacy to commissioning parents and surrogate mothers 
who are citizens or residents of the particular country or state: see Permanent Bureau Pre-
liminary Document 3C para 25. 
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The domicile requirement is clearly an attempt to discourage international 
surrogacy and, especially, to avoid South Africa becoming a destination for 
reproductive tourism.33 It also precludes the parties from selecting a different 
legal system or court for the determination of any legal disputes that may arise in 
connection with the surrogate motherhood agreement.34 It is important to note 
that the domicile requirement applies at the time when the surrogate motherhood 
agreement is entered into. Thus, the agreement may not be concluded before the 
commissioning parent has established a domicile in South Africa.  
South African law recognises three types of domicile: domicile of origin; 
domicile of choice; and domicile by operation of the law (or assigned domicile). 
Only domicile of choice is at issue in respect of foreigners who come to South 
Africa for purposes of obtaining a child via surrogacy.35 The requirements for 
acquiring a domicile of choice are that the person must have reached the age of 
majority or have the status of a major;36 have the mental capacity to make a 
rational choice; be lawfully present at the place where he or she has settled; and 
must intend to settle at that place for an indefinite period.37 It is doubted whether 
a prospective commissioning parent (whether single or part of a couple) could 
satisfy the requirement of having the intention to settle in South Africa for an 
________________________ 
 33 Reproductive tourism is sometimes, more euphemistically, called “reproductive travel” or 
“cross-border reproductive care”: see eg Permanent Bureau Preliminary Document 3B  
para 17; Storrow 2011 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 539; Gürtin 2011 Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online 555; Van Beers 2014 Medical LR 2. It might also be described as “cir-
cumvention tourism”. The latter term was coined by Cohen “Circumvention tourism” 2012 
Cornell LR 1309 to refer to travelling abroad for the purpose of circumventing domestic 
prohibitions, especially as to medical services. At the other extreme, people who engage in 
international surrogacy call it “reproductive exile” because they consider it to be forced 
travel to escape the restrictive regimes of their home countries: Inhorn and Patrizio 2009 
Fertility and Sterility 904. 
 34 Slabbert and Roodt 343. These authors characterise the domicile requirement as a unilat-
eral conflicts rule that determines “when South African law applies to a surrogate mother-
hood agreement, instead of identifying a single connecting factor for the category of 
validity of a surrogate motherhood agreement that would point in the direction of the applic-
able law”, such as that the agreement is governed by the law chosen by the parties. See also 
Oppong 233–234. 
 35 A person’s domicile of origin is the domicile the law confers on the person at birth. This 
type of domicile would not be relevant in the present context, for a foreigner who might 
have acquired a domicile of origin in South Africa because he or she was born in this coun-
try would have lost this domicile when he or she established a domicile in the foreign 
country, and s 3(2) of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992 expressly provides that a person’s domi-
cile of origin never revives. Thus, the person’s return to South Africa and/or the loss of his 
or her foreign domicile would not re-instate his or her South African domicile of origin. 
Domicile by operation of the law is the domicile the law assigns to a person who does not 
have the mental capacity to acquire a domicile of choice. As a person who does not have 
the mental capacity to make a rational choice would not be allowed to be a commissioning 
parent, this type of domicile would also not come into play. On the different types of domi-
cile, see Boezaart Persons 36–43; Forsyth Private international law (2012) 137–166; Hea-
ton Persons 42–46; Kruger and Skelton (eds) 72–79. 
 36 The age of majority is 18 years (s 17 of the Children’s Act). A minor acquires the status of 
majority through marriage. Although s 13(1) of the Civil Union Act confers all the con-
sequences of a marriage on a civil union, a minor cannot obtain the status of a major by  
entering into a civil union, because the definition of a civil union in s 1 of the Civil Union 
Act restricts civil unions to persons who are 18 years or older. 
 37 Ss 1(1) and (2) of the Domicile Act. 
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indefinite period if the main objective of his or her sojourn here is to obtain a 
child via surrogacy. Human nature being what it is, a prospective commissioning 
parent might, of course, hide the fact that the main reason for his or her moving 
to South Africa was to obtain a child via surrogacy and may, in this manner, 
dishonestly “comply” with the domicile requirement.  
If good cause is shown, the court may dispense with the domicile requirement 
in respect of the surrogate mother and her spouse, civil union partner or perma-
nent partner, but not in respect of the commissioning parent.38 For example, if 
the commissioning parent is domiciled in South African and a foreign relative of 
the commissioning parent is willing to act as altruistic surrogate mother, the 
court might be willing to dispense with the requirement that the surrogate mother 
must be domiciled in South Africa.39 
Unfortunately, it seems that courts sometimes accept commissioning parents’ 
mere assertion as sufficient in so far as the domicile requirement is concerned. In 
Ex parte WH,40 the commissioning parents, who were of Danish and Dutch 
origin, had been living in South Africa for only a year when the court confirmed 
their surrogate motherhood agreement. This confirmation application was the 
second the commissioning parents had made in their year of residence in South 
Africa. The first application had also been granted, but the surrogacy it related to 
had failed because the surrogate mother had fallen ill. The commissioning 
parents stated that they were domiciled in South Africa and that they “intend[ed] 
to stay here permanently”.41 However, as Bonthuys and Broeders point out:42  
“To enter into two surrogacy agreements and have them both confirmed by the 
extremely busy courts within a year of arriving in the country appears remarkable 
and should have sounded alarm bells to the court. It raises questions about how the 
commissioning parents established domicile so rapidly and whether, given the 
existence of two surrogacy agreements in this time, the purpose of their residence 
was not reproductive tourism.”43  
It also seems that the domicile requirement has not completely discouraged 
agencies from offering international surrogacy in South Africa. Although the 
website of one agency sets out the requirements for surrogacy in South Africa 
and specifically states that commissioning parents “must domicile [sic] in South 
Africa”,44 it also states, under the heading “Surrogacy in South Africa with non-
South African citizen intended parents”, that the particular agency “does manage 
international surrogacies from certain countries”, and advises persons who are 
“interested in an international surrogacy with a South African surrogate” to 
contact the agency.45  
________________________ 
 38 S 292(2). Schäfer 269 welcomes the absolute nature of the domicile requirement in respect 
of commissioning parents and warns that the court should “take extreme care” to avoid 
finding that there is good cause to dispense with the domicile requirement in respect of 
surrogate mothers in destinations where unregulated commercial surrogacy occurs. His 
view is strongly supported. 
 39 Louw Commentary 19–8; Louw 2013 THRHR 587. 
 40 Supra. 
 41 Para 15. 
 42 2013 SALJ 494. 
 43 The judgment does not indicate that the court considered this possibility. “If these issues 
were indeed addressed in the papers or canvassed with the legal representatives, the judg-
ment would, or at any rate should, have mentioned them” – Bonthuys and Broeders 2013 
SALJ 494.  
 44 http://bit.ly/1ygiVGX (accessed 6 July 2014). 
 45 http://bit.ly/W36ssx (accessed 6 July 2014). 
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2 1 3 Artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother 
Another important restriction the Children’s Act imposes is that the surrogate 
mother may not be artificially fertilised until the surrogate motherhood agree-
ment has been confirmed.46 Thus, for example, a foreign commissioning parent 
may not engage the services of a surrogate mother in South Africa and have her 
artificially fertilised before the commissioning parent has satisfied the require-
ments for acquiring a domicile in this country.  
2 1 4 Consequences of a valid surrogate motherhood agreement 
If the surrogate motherhood agreement is valid, it is enforceable, and the surro-
gate mother must hand the child over to the commissioning parent(s) as soon as 
is reasonably possible after the child’s birth.47 The child is deemed to be the 
child of the commissioning parent(s) for all purposes as from the moment of his 
or her birth.48 The surrogate mother, her husband, civil union partner, or partner 
in a permanent relationship and her relations have no parental responsibilities and 
rights in respect of the child.49  
However, if the surrogate mother is genetically related to the child because her 
ovum was used,50 she may terminate the agreement by filing a written notice 
with the court up to sixty days after the child’s birth.51 If the court finds that the 
termination is voluntary and that the surrogate mother understands the effects of 
the termination, the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement is 
terminated and the surrogate mother becomes the child’s parent. If she has a 
spouse, civil union partner or partner in a permanent relationship, that person 
also becomes the child’s parent. If the surrogate mother does not have a spouse, 
civil union partner or permanent partner, the commissioning father becomes the 
child’s parent along with the surrogate mother.52 
The surrogate mother may also terminate the surrogate motherhood agreement 
by terminating her pregnancy in terms of the Choice on Termination of Preg-
nancy Act 92 of 1996.53 Furthermore, she can escape enforcement of a valid 
surrogate motherhood agreement by leaving South Africa and going to a country 
where surrogacy is not recognised, and where the rules of private international 
________________________ 
 46 S 296(1)(a). But see Ex parte MS 2014 3 SA 415 (GP), where Keightley AJ held that the 
High Court may, in exceptional circumstances, confirm a surrogacy agreement after the 
surrogate mother has fallen pregnant if confirmation is in the best interests of the child who 
is to be born. 
 47 S 297(1)(b).  
 48 S 297(1)(a).  
 49 S 297(1)(c). However, they may have contact with the child if the surrogate motherhood 
agreement permits this: s 297(1)(d). 
 50 That is, in the case of traditional surrogacy: see fn 8 above. 
 51 S 298(1). 
 52 The stage at which the surrogate mother and her spouse, civil union partner or partner in  
a permanent relationship or the commissioning father become the child’s parents depends 
on whether the agreement is terminated before or after the child’s birth: s 299(a) and (b). 
On the problems arising from application of s 299(a) and (b) if the commissioning parents  
are same-sex civil union partners, see Heaton “The right to same-sex marriage in South  
Africa” in Gerber and Sifris (eds) Current trends in the regulation of same-sex relation-
ships (2010) 115. 
 53 S 300(1) of the Children’s Act. 
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law will not permit the recognition and enforcement of the South African court 
order confirming the surrogate motherhood agreement.54 
2 2 Commercial surrogacy  
In terms of the Children’s Act, the court which is requested to confirm a surro-
gate motherhood agreement may not do so if the surrogate mother is using 
surrogacy as a source of income or if she entered into the agreement for com-
mercial purposes.55 Because the court may not confirm an agreement which 
provides for commercial surrogacy, the agreement is inevitably invalid.56 Fur-
thermore, anyone who gives or promises to give to, or receive from, any person 
any compensation or reward in respect of a surrogate motherhood agreement 
commits an offence57 unless the compensation is for expenses that relate directly 
to the artificial fertilisation and pregnancy of the surrogate mother, the birth of 
the child, or confirmation of the agreement; loss of earnings suffered by the 
surrogate mother as a result of the agreement; and insurance to cover the surro-
gate mother for anything that may lead to her death or disability as a result of the 
pregnancy.58 Finally, a person who artificially fertilises a surrogate mother or 
renders assistance in artificial fertilisation in the absence of a court-confirmed 
surrogate motherhood agreement, commits a crime.59 It is therefore abundantly 
clear that South African law considers commercial surrogacy to be illegal, 
against public policy and, in some respects, a crime. 
3 CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY 
Because different rules apply to the two instances of international surrogacy this 
article deals with, the discussion below considers the consequences of the two 
instances under two different subheadings. The position if persons who are not 
domiciled in South Africa obtain a child via surrogacy here is discussed first. 
Then, the position of South Africans who obtain a child via surrogacy in a 
foreign country is set out. 
3 1 Persons who are not domiciled in South Africa who obtain a child via 
surrogacy here 
If persons who do not comply with the domicile requirement in the Children’s 
Act seek to obtain a child in South Africa via surrogacy, any surrogate mother-
hood agreement they enter into is invalid and unenforceable regardless of whether 
the surrogacy is altruistic or commercial.60  
________________________ 
 54 Louw Commentary 19–8. See also Schäfer 280, who submits, correctly, that the surrogate 
mother’s right to freedom of movement would win the day if the commissioning parent(s) 
tried to interdict the surrogate mother from leaving the country. 
 55 S 295(c)(iv) and (v). It can be very difficult to determine whether surrogacy is altruistic or 
commercial. Commercial payments can easily be included under the guise of compensation 
for expenses, loss of earnings, and so forth. This risk seems to increase if an agency is in-
volved: see eg Ex parte WH supra para 64. 
 56 S 292(1)(e) read with s 295(c)(iv) and (v); see also s 297(2). The consequences of invalidity 
are discussed in para 3 1. 
 57 Ss 292(1)(a), 295(c)(iv) and (v), 297(2) and 301(1).  
 58 S 301(2). Anyone who renders a bona fide professional legal or medical service with a 
view to the confirmation of a surrogate motherhood agreement or in the execution of such 
an agreement is entitled to reasonable compensation for such service: s 301(3). 
 59 S 303(1).  
 60 Ss 292(1) and 297(2). 
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In terms of section 297(2) of the Act, the surrogate mother is deemed to be the 
child’s mother “for all purposes”. The section does not expressly provide that the 
child has no legal relationship with the commissioning parent(s), but this result 
follows from section 40(3) of the Act, read with section 296 and the definition of 
“artificial fertilisation” in section 1. Artificial fertilisation is defined so broadly 
that it includes all forms of surrogacy.61 Section 40(3) states that the conse-
quences of artificial fertilisation are as follows:  
“(2) Subject to section 296, whenever the gamete or gametes of any person have 
been used for the artificial fertilisation of a woman, any child born of that 
woman as a result of such artificial fertilisation must for all purposes be 
regarded to be the child of that woman. 
(3) Subject to section 296, no right, responsibility, duty or obligation arises 
between a child born of a woman as a result of artificial fertilisation and any 
person whose gamete has or gametes have been used for such artificial ferti-
lisation or the blood relations of that person, except when— 
(a) that person is the woman who gave birth to that child; or 
(b) that person was the husband of such woman at the time of such artificial 
fertilisation.” 
Consequently, unless section 296 applies, the woman who was artificially fer-
tilised (the surrogate mother) and her husband or civil union partner62 (if any) 
acquire parental responsibilities and rights to the exclusion of the gamete donors. 
Section 296 specifically deals with the artificial fertilisation of a surrogate 
mother. It provides that she may not be artificially fertilised until the court has 
confirmed the surrogate motherhood agreement, and that the artificial fertilisa-
tion must take place within eighteen months after confirmation of the agree-
ment.63 The wording of section 296 suggests that the legislature envisaged that 
the section would apply only to confirmed (valid) surrogate motherhood agree-
ments. As an invalid surrogate motherhood agreement falls outside the ambit of 
section 296, the proviso in section 40(3) does not apply to it. Consequently, the 
commissioning parents acquire no rights, responsibilities, duties or obligations in 
respect of the child, regardless of whether either or both of them donated gametes 
for the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother. In short, they are not the 
child’s legal parents. 
They could become the child’s legal parents by adopting the child. However, 
they are likely to experience problems in getting an adoption order. If they want 
to adopt the child in South Africa, the provisions of the Children’s Act on inter-
country adoption come into play. The Act draws a distinction between cases 
where the adoption applicants are habitually resident in a country in which the 
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of  
________________________ 
 61 The definition of artificial fertilisation encompasses the introduction, by artificial means, of 
a male gamete into the internal reproductive organs of a woman for the purpose of human 
reproduction, the joining of a male and female gamete outside the human body with a view 
to placing the product in a woman’s womb, and the actual placing of such product in a 
woman’s womb. 
 62 S 13(2)(b) of the Civil Union Act provides that, with the exception of the Marriage Act 25 
of 1961 and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, any reference to 
“husband” includes a civil union partner.  
 63 S 296(1)(a) and (b). 
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Inter-country Adoption (“Convention on Inter-country Adoption”)64 has entered 
into force (“Convention country”),65 and those in which it has not.66  
If applicants who are habitually resident in a Convention country want to 
adopt a child who is habitually resident in South Africa,67 they must comply with 
the requirements of the Children’s Act and the Convention on Inter-country 
Adoption.68 They might not be able to do so.69  
First, the subsidiarity principle must be satisfied.70 The subsidiarity principle 
does not exclude adoption of a South African child71 by foreigners, but requires 
________________________ 
 64 Generally on the Convention on Inter-country Adoption, see Boezaart (ed) Child law in 
South Africa 378–388; Heaton South African family law (2010) 296–298; Schäfer 515–540; 
Skelton and Carnelley (eds) Family law in South Africa (2010) 307–315. 
 65 The definition of “convention country” in s 1 of the Children’s Act excludes “a country 
against whose accession the Republic has raised an objection under Article 44 of the Con-
vention”. Such a country is treated as a non-Convention country. 
 66 Ss 261 and 262. 
 67 Neither the Convention on Inter-country Adoption nor the Children’s Act defines “habitual 
residence”, and no South African court has made a pronouncement on the term in so far as 
the Convention on Inter-country Adoption is concerned. In the context of a different Con-
vention – the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction – 
our courts have held that a child’s habitual residence is determined with reference to his or 
her parents’ shared intention as to habitual residence, and that where the parents have a 
common habitual residence, their habitual residence is also the child’s habitual residence: 
Senior Family Advocate, Cape Town v Houtman 2004 6 SA 274 (C); Central Authority 
(South Africa) v A 2007 5 SA 501 (W); Central Authority v MR (LS Intervening) 2011 2 
SA 428 (GNP). It is not unlikely that our courts will adopt a similar approach to the mean-
ing of “habitual residence” in respect of the Convention on Inter-country Adoption. As the 
surrogate mother is the child’s legal parent in the case of invalid surrogacy (s 297(2) of  
the Children’s Act), it is – for purposes of this article – assumed that the child shares her 
habitual residence and, because the surrogacy occurred in South Africa, it is assumed that  
the mother’s habitual residence is South Africa. Consequently, the child is assumed to be  
habitually resident in South Africa for purposes of the inter-country adoption application. 
 68 S 261 of the Children’s Act. S 261(8) creates an exception if the applicant is a family 
member of the child or will become an adoptive parent jointly with the child’s biological 
parent. In such event, the adoption is governed by the rules that apply to an in-country 
adoption (ie Ch 15 of the Children’s Act). As s 40(3) of the Children’s Act excludes  
gamete donors from acquiring legal parentage of a child born as a result of an invalid sur-
rogate motherhood agreement (see above), it is unlikely that a South African court would 
find that the exception is applicable even if the gametes of one or both of the commission-
ing parents were used in the surrogacy. 
 69 See also Slabbert and Roodt 344.   
 70 A 4(b); see also a 21(b) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
a 24(b) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.  
 71 Because the surrogate motherhood agreement is invalid, the surrogate mother is the child’s 
mother for all purposes: s 297(2) of the Children’s Act. If the surrogate mother is a South 
African citizen, the child has South African citizenship by birth: s 2(1)(b) of the South  
African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. Therefore the child qualifies as “a South African 
child” as envisaged in the text above. This is also the position if the child was born in South 
Africa and he or she does not have, or is not entitled to, citizenship or nationality of any 
other country, and his or her birth has been registered in South Africa in accordance with 
the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992: s 2(2) of the South African Citizenship 
Act. A more detailed discussion of acquisition of citizenship by the child falls outside the 
scope of this article as citizenship is primarily a public law matter. 
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that the possibilities for placing the child in South Africa must first be consid-
ered.72 The Children’s Act furthermore requires that the name of the child must 
have been in the Register on Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive 
Parents for at least sixty days and no fit and proper adoptive parent must be 
available for the child in South Africa.73 It is unlikely that these requirements 
would have been met if the child was procreated for specific commissioning 
parents.  
Secondly, the Convention on Inter-country Adoption stipulates that there should 
be no contact between the prospective adoptive parents and the child’s parents 
(here, the surrogate mother and her spouse or civil union partner, if any) until it 
has been determined that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and 
suitable adoptive parents; that the child is adoptable; that the subsidiarity prin-
ciple has been applied; that an inter-country adoption is in the child’s best 
interests; and that the necessary consent has been given freely and without 
having been induced by payment or compensation of any kind.74 In the case of 
surrogacy, contact might have occurred when the surrogate motherhood agree-
ment was entered into, when the assisted reproduction treatment took place, 
when the child was born, and/or after the child’s birth. Furthermore, even in the 
case of altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate mother’s consent might be said to have 
been induced by payment or compensation, albeit compensation for expenses she 
incurred.  
Thirdly, the central authorities of both countries must agree to the adoption.75 
Whether the central authority of either South Africa or the foreign country will 
agree to an inter-country adoption of a child who was procreated as a result of an 
invalid surrogate motherhood agreement – particularly an invalid commercial 
surrogate motherhood agreement – is a matter of speculation. If the central 
authorities do agree and the adoption application comes before the Children’s 
Court in South Africa, the court might be willing to grant an inter-country 
adoption if this is in the best interests of the child, since section 28(2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and section 9 of the Chil-
dren’s Act afford paramountcy to the child’s best interests. Then again, the 
Children’s Court might not be eager to deviate from the express requirements of 
the Children’s Act and the Convention on Inter-country Adoption. It might hold 
that the requirements set by the Act and the Convention on Inter-country Adop-
tion specifically have the objective of protecting the best interests of children76 
and that deviation from the requirements would run counter to the child’s best 
interests. 
________________________ 
 72 AD v DW (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae; Department for Social Development as 
Intervening Party) 2008 3 SA 183 (CC).  
 73 S 261(5)(g) of the Children’s Act. 
 74 A 29, read with aa 4(a)–(c) and 5(a). An exception is allowed in the case of adoption by a 
family member. 
 75 A 17(c); s 261(5)(e) and (f) of the Children’s Act. 
 76 The objects of the Convention on Inter-country Adoption expressly include establishing 
safeguards “to ensure that inter-country adoptions take place in the best interests of the 
child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law”: 
a 1(a). 
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If the commissioning parents are habitually resident in a non-Convention 
country, the provisions of the Convention on Inter-country Adoption obviously 
do not operate. However, in terms of the Children’s Act, the subsidiarity prin-
ciple must still be applied,77 the name of the child must have been in the Register 
on Adoptable Children and Prospective Adoptive Parents for at least sixty days, 
and no fit and proper adoptive parent must be available for the child in South 
Africa.78 In this case, too, it is unlikely that these requirements would have been 
met. Secondly, the competent authority in the country of habitual residence of 
the applicants would have to be satisfied that the applicants are fit and proper to 
adopt.79 Whether the competent authority will find persons who participated in 
invalid surrogacy fit and proper to adopt will depend on local legal rules and 
public policy regarding surrogacy. Further, the foreign competent authority and 
the South African central authority must agree to the adoption.80 It is unclear 
whether they would be willing to do so, especially if the child was conceived as 
a result of commercial surrogacy. If they do agree, the same considerations 
regarding the best interests of the child and deviation from the provisions of the 
Children’s Act that apply to applicants who are habitually resident in a Conven-
tion country will come into play. 
If the commissioning parents want to remove the child from South Africa to 
their country of origin to obtain an adoption there, they will probably encounter 
their first hurdle when they attempt to obtain a passport for the child from the 
South African authorities.81 The application for the passport must be accompa-
nied by the child’s birth certificate82 and the personal particulars of the parents or 
legal guardian of the child who applied for the passport must be verified from the 
South African population register.83 As a child who is born of invalid surrogacy 
has no legal relationship with the commissioning parents, their names would not 
appear on the birth certificate. The certificate would identify the surrogate 
mother as the child’s mother. If the surrogate mother is a party to a marriage or 
civil union, her husband or civil union partner would be registered as the child’s 
________________________ 
 77 AD v DW supra. 
 78 S 262(5)(g) of the Children’s Act. S 262(8) creates an exception if the applicant is a family 
member of the child or will become an adoptive parent jointly with the child’s biological 
parent. As in the case of the exception in s 261(8) (see fn 68 above), it is doubted whether a 
South African court would find that the exception is applicable even if the gametes of one 
or both of the commissioning parents were used in the surrogacy. 
 79 S 262(2) of the Children’s Act. 
 80 S 262(4) and 262(5)(e) and (f) of the Children’s Act. 
 81 Every South African citizen is entitled to a South African passport: s 21(4) of the Constitu-
tion; s 3 of the South African Passports and Travel Documents Act 4 of 1994. Therefore, 
the applicants would approach the South African authorities for a passport for the child if 
the child is a South African citizen. Because the surrogate motherhood agreement is in-
valid, the surrogate mother is the child’s mother for all purposes, and if she is a South Afri-
can citizen, the child has South African citizenship by birth. The child also has South 
African citizenship if he or she was born in South Africa and he or she does not have, or is 
not entitled to, citizenship or nationality of any other country, and his or her birth has been 
registered in South Africa in accordance with the Births and Deaths Registration Act: see 
fn 71 above. 
 82 Reg 3(2)(b)(ii) of the South African Passports and Travel Documents Regulations issued 
under the South African Passports and Travel Documents Act.  
 83 Regs 3(2)(b)(ii) and 3(3)(e) of the South African Passports and Travel Documents Regula-
tions issued under the South African Passports and Travel Documents Act. 
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father.84 The information set out on the birth certificate would alert the authori-
ties to the fact that persons who are not the legal parents or guardians of the child 
are applying for a passport for a child. This would, in all probability, result in an 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the child’s birth, which would 
alert the authorities to the invalid surrogacy. For this reason the parties might be 
tempted to keep the fact of the surrogacy secret and to fraudulently indicate the 
commissioning father as the child’s father, or even to indicate both commission-
ing parents as the child’s parents when the child’s birth is registered. By doing so 
they would be committing a crime.85 Nevertheless, if such fraud is committed, 
the “father” or “parents” might be able to obtain a passport for the child from the 
authorities of their country of origin and be allowed to take the child with them 
when they leave South Africa.86 However, when the commissioning parents 
make the adoption application in their country of origin, their application might 
be scuppered by the fact that the authorities in their country of origin are likely to 
question the need for an adoption because the “father” or “parents” are indicated 
as the child’s parent(s) on the child’s birth certificate. 87 The commissioning 
parents might then have to apply to have the details in the notice of the child’s 
birth in South Africa set aside, in which event they and the surrogate mother 
could be criminally charged in South Africa.  
It must also be borne in mind that if the commissioning father was fraudulently 
registered as the child’s parent along with the surrogate mother, the commission-
ing mother would have no legal parental status in respect of the child even if the 
fraud was never challenged. She would have to seek an adoption order or a 
parental order88 in her country of origin in order to become the child’s legal 
parent. When she does so, the true facts about the international surrogacy might 
come to the fore and the recognition of the parental status of the commissioning 
father might also become an issue.  
Of course, even though the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 
prescribes that all births which occur in South Africa must be registered in terms 
of the Act,89 that the registration must occur within thirty days of the birth,90 and 
that failing “without reasonable cause” to notify the Director-general of Home 
________________________ 
 84 S 9(2) read with s 1(1) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act; s 13 of the Civil Union 
Act. 
 85 S 31(1)(b) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act.  
 86 If the surrogate mother and the commissioning father were fraudulently indicated as the 
child’s parents, the surrogate mother – being the child’s legal mother and guardian – would 
have to consent to the child’s departure from South Africa and would have to give her writ-
ten consent to the application for the child’s passport: Children’s Act, s 18(3)(c)(iii) and 
(iv), read with reg 3(3)(j) of the South African Passports and Travel Documents Regula-
tions issued under the South African Passports and Travel Documents Act.  
 87 It should be noted that some countries do not automatically recognise a foreign birth 
certificate (in this case, a birth certificate issued in South Africa). Some countries insist on 
legalisation or apostillisation of the document before its authenticity is accepted: see eg 
Permanent Bureau Preliminary Document 3C paras 85–87.  
 88 Parental orders are made in eg England in order to terminate the surrogate mother’s 
parental responsibilities and rights and confer them on the commissioning parents: ss 30 
and 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.  
 89 S 2 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Act apply not only to South African 
citizens but also to non-citizens “who sojourn permanently or temporarily in the Republic, 
for whatever purpose”. 
 90 S 9(1).  
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Affairs of a birth is a crime,91 the parties might decide not to have the child’s 
birth registered in South Africa at all and instead to seek registration of the 
child’s birth in their country of origin. Whether they would be able to obtain 
such registration would depend on the provisions of the law of the foreign 
country. In many instances they might have to resort to the same fraud men-
tioned above. Depending on the course of action taken by the commissioning 
parents and the provisions of the law of the foreign country, the commissioning 
parents might succeed in obtaining a passport from the authorities in their coun-
try of origin and might be able to take the child with them when they leave South 
Africa. 
If the child’s birth is registered in South Africa and the commissioning father 
or both commissioning parents are not entered as the child’s parents, the com-
missioning parents might decide to obtain an order from the High Court granting 
them sole guardianship and sole care on the ground of the best interests of the 
child, before they seek to take the child to their country of origin. However, the 
Constitutional Court has held that orders granting sole guardianship and sole care 
of South African children92 to foreigners who intend to obtain an inter-country 
adoption abroad will be made only in exceptional circumstances.93 Furthermore, 
the Children’s Act provides that if a non-South African citizen applies to the 
High Court for an order granting him or her guardianship, the application must 
be regarded as an inter-country adoption for the purposes of the Convention on 
Inter-country Adoption.94 Thus, the commissioning parents will be faced with the 
problems relating to an inter-country adoption set out above. 
3 2 South Africans95 obtain a child via surrogacy in a foreign country  
South African law does not prohibit South African citizens or persons who are 
domiciled or resident in this country from participating in surrogacy in a foreign 
country.96 However, as altruistic surrogacy is legal in South Africa, there is little 
need for such persons to resort to international surrogacy. This is true of hetero-
sexual and same-sex couples and single persons.97 South African prospective 
commissioning parents are only likely to engage in international surrogacy if 
they do not want their gametes to be used for the artificial fertilisation of the 
surrogate mother (for instance, because they suffer from genetic disorders they 
do not want to transfer to a child); the commissioning mother can give birth but 
chooses not to do so; medical facilities are better or surrogacy is cheaper in the 
foreign country; the commissioning parents want to access a bigger pool of 
________________________ 
 91 S 31(1)(a). 
 92 On the issue of when a child is “a South African child”, see fn 71 above. 
 93 AD v DW supra. 
 94 S 25. 
 95 On the term “South Africans”, see fn 18 above.  
 96 Turkish law expressly criminalises travelling abroad for purposes of any type of surrogacy: 
Items 18.4–18.7 of the Legislation Concerning Assisted Reproduction Treatment Practices 
as set out by Gürtin 2011 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 556 557–558. See also s 11(2) 
read with s 8 of the New South Wales Surrogacy Act 2010, which criminalises any com-
mercial surrogacy arrangement made by anyone who is ordinarily resident or domiciled in 
New South Wales. S 54 read with s 56 of the Queensland Surrogacy Act 2010 criminalises 
any commercial surrogacy arrangement made by anyone who is ordinarily resident in 
Queensland.  
 97 See para 2. 
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potential surrogate mothers; or they are set on “ordering” a child who has specific 
physical or racial characteristics. 
If South Africans obtain a child via surrogacy in a foreign country, they are 
bound to encounter many of the problems which persons who are not domiciled 
in South Africa encounter when they obtain a child via surrogacy in South 
Africa.98 For instance, they might not be recognised as the legal parents of the 
child either in South Africa or in the foreign country.  
Three criteria are commonly used to assign legal parentage to a person: a  
genetic link between the person and the child (that is, the person’s sperm or 
ovum was used to conceive the child); the person’s intention to become a parent 
(that is, the person intended to become the child’s parent by “commissioning” 
the surrogate mother to carry the child for him or her); and giving birth to the 
child.99 Different jurisdictions apply different criteria, with the result that a 
person may qualify as the child’s legal parent in one country but not in another.100 
Even if the foreign country were to confer legal parentage on one or both of 
the commissioning parents, their parentage might not be recognised in South 
Africa. Recognition in one country of parental status that was afforded to a 
person by the law of another country is a matter that is governed by the rules of 
private international law. If commissioning parents participated in altruistic 
surrogacy which was valid in terms of the law of the foreign country and the law 
of the foreign country automatically conferred legal parentage on them, their 
parental status is likely to be recognised in South Africa since altruistic surro-
gacy is permitted in this country too.101 If the foreign surrogacy was commercial, 
the matter would become more complicated. As there is widespread international 
distaste for commercial surrogacy and commercial surrogacy is illegal and 
against public policy102 in South Africa, a South African court might withhold 
recognition from the commissioning parents’ legal parentage even if the com-
mercial surrogacy was valid in terms of the law of the foreign country. Then 
again, the court might argue that if the commissioning parents were excluded as 
the child’s legal parents and the child’s unwilling surrogate mother was com-
pelled to be the child’s parent, the child would probably end up in alternative 
care. Such a state of affairs would not be in the best interests of the child as it 
________________________ 
 98 Cf para 3 1. 
 99 See eg Groenewald 43; Brunet et al 23; Henaghan 2013 Australian J of Adoption 3–4. 
 100 Different jurisdictions also have different rules on the grounds for challenging a person’s 
status as a parent and on who may bring such an action: see Preliminary Document 3C 
paras 11–14 31–37.  
 101 But see Oppong 234, who states that it is unlikely that a South African court would 
recognise surrogacy that is valid in terms of the law of the foreign jurisdiction but does 
not comply with the requirements of the Children’s Act. The implication of his view is 
that foreign surrogacy would never be recognised as the surrogate motherhood agreement 
would not have been entered into in South Africa, as is required by s 292(1)(b) of the 
Children’s Act. Such blanket non-recognition of foreign surrogate motherhood agreements 
would have very negative consequences for the commissioning parents and for the child.   
 102 It must be borne in mind that, because the recognition issue is decided by applying the 
rules of private international law, it is not just national (ie internal) public policy which is 
at issue. Public policy in the international sense (ie public policy which might require ex-
clusion of foreign law because application of the foreign law would be repugnant) also 
comes into play. On public policy generally as a ground for exclusion of foreign law, see 
Forsyth 120–123. For a brief overview of public policy as a ground for non-recognition of 
legal parentage, see Permanent Bureau Preliminary Document 3C paras 98–102. 
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would amount to punishing the child for the actions of the commissioning 
parents and the surrogate mother. The court might hold that denying recognition 
to the legal parentage of the commissioning parents would unjustifiably violate 
the paramountcy of the child’s best interests.103 It might also hold that denying 
the child parental care by commissioning parents who want to provide parental 
care to him or her, unjustifiably violates his or her constitutional right to parental 
care.104 Consequently, recognition might be afforded to the commissioning 
parents’ status as legal parents of the child even in the case of foreign commer-
cial surrogacy. 
If the South African commissioning parents, or one of them, did not automati-
cally become the child’s legal parents as a result of the foreign surrogacy, but the 
court in the foreign country made an inter-country adoption order in favour of 
the commissioning parent(s), the South African central authority (Director-
general of Social Development)105 has the power to refuse to recognise the adop-
tion if it is manifestly contrary to South African public policy.106 As commercial 
surrogacy is against South African public policy, the Director-general might 
withhold recognition from an adoption of a child who was born as a result of 
commercial surrogacy. However, in exercising his or her power, the Director-
general must also take into account the child’s best interests.107 Depending on the 
Director-general’s stance in this regard, he or she might conclude that withhold-
ing recognition to the adoption simply because the child was born as a result of 
commercial surrogacy would not be in the child’s best interests. If the Director-
general refuses to recognise the foreign inter-country adoption order, the Chil-
dren’s Court may be approached for an adoption order under the Children’s Act.108  
If a court in the foreign country made a different type of order relating to the 
parental status of the commissioning parents or one of them, such as a parental 
order,109 public policy may be invoked to justify non-recognition of the order, 
while the best interests of the child and the child’s right to parental care may be 
invoked to justify its recognition. In the event of non-recognition, the South 
African commissioning parents would have to seek an order from the South 
African High Court appointing them sole guardians and sole caregivers of the 
child in the best interests of the child.110 Otherwise, they would have to seek a 
local adoption order in terms of the Children’s Act.111  
If the commissioning parents wanted to return to South Africa with the child, 
they would most probably face similar problems to those encountered by  
foreigners who obtain a child via surrogacy in South Africa. If the child is a 
________________________ 
 103 S 28(2) read with s 36 of the Constitution; see also s 9 of the Children’s Act. 
 104 S 28(1)(b) read with s 36 of the Constitution. 
 105  S 257(1)(a) of the Children’s Act. 
 106 S 270(1) of the Children’s Act; a 24 of the Convention on Inter-country Adoption. 
 107 Ibid. 
 108 S 271 of the Children’s Act. 
 109 On such orders, see fn 88 above.  
 110 They could seek such an order from the High Court in its capacity as upper guardian of all 
minors or in terms of s 23 or s 24 of the Children’s Act.  
 111 Ch 15 of the Children’s Act governs local adoptions, ie adoptions that are not inter-
country adoptions. 
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South African citizen,112 he or she is entitled to a South African passport,113 
which will enable him or her to enter South Africa. However, the application for 
the child’s passport must be accompanied by a copy of the child’s birth certifi-
cate and the personal particulars of the parents or legal guardian of the child who 
applied for the passport must be verified from the South African population 
register.114 The information set out in the birth certificate might alert the South 
African authorities to the fact that the child was born as a result of international 
surrogacy and that the commissioning parents might not be the child’s legal 
parents (and that the child might not be entitled to a South African passport as he 
or she is not a citizen of this country). If the commissioning parents – or the 
surrogate mother and the commissioning father – attempted to have the child’s 
birth registered under the Births and Deaths Registration Act, the South African 
authorities might be alerted to the international surrogacy even before an applica-
tion is made for a passport for the child. The Births and Deaths Registration Act 
provides that if a child’s parent is a South African citizen, the head of a South 
African diplomatic or consular mission or a regional representative in South 
Africa may be notified of the foreign birth of the child to enable the child to 
obtain a South African birth certificate.115 The person who wants to have the 
child’s birth registered in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Act must 
“submit a birth certificate or other similar document issued by the authority 
concerned in the country in which the birth occurred”.116 This certificate or 
document might alert the South African authorities to the fact that the persons 
who are indicated as the child’s parents might not qualify as the child’s legal 
parents in terms of South African law. In such event, the commissioning parents 
would first have to obtain a court order clarifying their parental status.   
If the law of the country where the child was born does not recognise the 
commissioning parents as the child’s legal parents, the South African commis-
sioning parents and the child’s surrogate mother might conspire to indicate the 
commissioning parents or the surrogate mother and the commissioning father as 
the child’s parents – just like persons who obtain a child via international surro-
gacy in South Africa might do. Such a false registration is likely to violate some 
or another provision of the law of the foreign country. And, as is the position if 
foreigners fraudulently register the commissioning father as the child’s parent 
along with the surrogate mother if the child is born via surrogacy in South 
Africa, the commissioning mother would have no legal parental status in respect 
of the child if her name does not appear as the child’s parent on the birth register. 
She would have to seek an adoption order (inter-country or local) or another 
order conferring parental status on her. In those proceedings, the true facts about 
the international surrogacy might come to the fore and recognition of the paren-
tal status of the commissioning father might also become an issue.  
________________________ 
 112 Regardless of where the child was born, he or she has South African citizenship by birth 
if one of his or her parents is a South African citizen: s 2(1)(b) of the South African Citi-
zenship Act. See further fn 71 above. 
 113 See fn 81 above. 
 114 See the authority cited in fn 83 above. 
 115 S 13. 
 116 Reg 10 of the Regulations on the Registration of Births and Deaths issued under the 
Births and Deaths Registration Act. 
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4 SOUTH AFRICA’S OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH 
INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY 
The discussion above illustrates some of the legal problems which may arise if 
persons who are not domiciled in South Africa obtain a child via surrogacy in 
this country and if South Africans obtain a child via surrogacy in a foreign 
country. Of course, these types of legal problems arise from international surro-
gacy throughout the world. For this reason, an international instrument on 
surrogacy would probably be the ideal method to address these problems. The 
feasibility of a private international law instrument on international surrogacy is 
currently being investigated by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law.117 If it is decided that such an instrument is indeed 
feasible, it will be some time before the instrument comes to fruition.118 Then, of 
course, its effectiveness will depend on the enforcement mechanisms it provides 
for and the number of state parties that ratify and implement it.  
While the feasibility and content of an international instrument are being  
investigated and debated, South Africa can employ various means to deal specif-
ically with the problems arising from the two instances of international surrogacy 
identified in this article.  
First, legislation which compels all South African organs of state to withhold 
recognition from surrogacy by non-domiciled foreigners in South Africa and by 
South Africans in a foreign country, including denying the commissioning 
parents the status of legal parents of the child in all circumstances, can be en-
acted. Such blanket non-recognition is not supported as its rigidity is bound to 
increase the risk of harm to all parties and particularly to the child, who might 
end up parentless and stateless. 
A more pragmatic (or, some might say, a more defeatist) option would be to 
enact legislation which, for purposes of South African law,119 recognises the 
identified instances of international surrogacy and confers parental status on the 
commissioning parents. If this approach were followed, the legislature might 
decide to differentiate between altruistic and commercial international surrogacy, 
and it might withhold recognition from commercial international surrogacy.120  
Another option, which relates only to South Africans who go abroad for sur-
rogacy, is to enact legislation which prohibits any person who is a domiciled or 
resident in South Africa from engaging in surrogacy abroad. Such legislation 
would be similar to Turkey’s ban on foreign surrogacy by Turks, and the New 
South Wales and Queensland ban on commercial surrogacy by persons who are 
domiciled or habitually resident in these states.121 Effective enforcement of such 
________________________ 
 117 See fn 4 above. 
 118 On the possible content of a convention on international surrogacy, see Trimmings and 
Beaumont (eds) 635–646; Groenewald 50–67; Permanent Bureau Preliminary report 29–30; 
Mohapatra 2012 Berkeley J of Int L 449; Mortazavi 2012 Georgetown LJ 2287–2289; Lin 
2013 Cardozo J of Int and Comp L 567–568.  
 119 Clearly, South African law cannot dictate whether foreign countries must recognise such 
instances of international surrogacy. 
 120 For recent local support for recognition of commercial surrogacy, see Louw 2013 THRHR 
580–582; Nicholson 2013 SAJHR 496. For earlier support, see Meyerson Gender 123–134; 
Lupton “The right to be born: Surrogacy and the legal control of human fertility” 1988 De 
Jure 36 40. 
 121 See fn 96 above. 
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legislation could be problematic. Committing commissioning parents to prison 
for breach of the prohibition would probably not be the answer, for the child who 
was born as a result of the surrogacy might end up in alternative care despite 
having parents who want to provide and care for him or her, which could surely 
not be in the child’s best interests. If the penalty was only a fine, some partici-
pants in international surrogacy might view the fine as little more than yet 
another expense to add to the cost of obtaining a child. 
Yet another option, which also relates only to South Africans who go abroad 
for surrogacy, is to send letters to foreign fertilisation clinics South Africans  
are known to use, warning them that they should not engage in any surrogacy 
arrangements with South Africans until the South Africans have consulted the 
South African Consul-General or High Commissioner in the particular country 
with a view to establishing whether they would be recognised as the child’s legal 
parents in South Africa. In 2010, eight European countries issued similar warn-
ings to fertility clinics in India.122 The laws of these European countries either 
completely prohibit surrogacy or prohibit commercial surrogacy (which is legal 
in India).123 Problems are bound to arise when enforcement of such warnings is 
attempted. It should be noted that such warnings specifically to fertility clinics in 
India have in any event become redundant, because India has revised its visa 
requirements to compel all foreigners who want to visit the country for the pur-
poses of surrogacy to apply for a medical visa instead of a tourist visa. The 
application for a medical visa must be accompanied by a letter from the embassy 
or foreign ministry of the country of origin of the commissioning parents in 
India, stating that the country of origin recognises surrogacy and that the child 
will be allowed to enter the country of origin of the commissioning parents as the 
commissioning parents’ child. The commissioning parents must also produce the 
duly notarised surrogate motherhood agreement they concluded with the surro-
gate mother.124  
The final option is to retain the current position of leaving individual cases to 
be decided by the courts. Conflicting decisions and legal uncertainty are bound 
to be the outcome. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The legal problems created by international surrogacy do not lend themselves to 
easy solutions. By prohibiting and criminalising commercial surrogacy, setting 
strict requirements for altruistic surrogacy and, particularly, by enacting the 
domicile requirement, the South African legislature has attempted to limit the 
instances in which these problems may arise as a result of reproductive tourism 
in South Africa. Unfortunately, it seems that the domicile requirement is not 
always applied strictly. This problem should be addressed by amending the 
________________________ 
 122 Davis “The rise of gestational surrogacy and the pressing need for international regula-
tion” 2012 Minnesota J of Int L 129 132; Henaghan 2013 Australian J of Adoption 4–5; 
“Friday legal updates – India surrogacy & the European Union” http://bit.ly/1mASEiR 
(accessed 8 July 2014); Roy “Bar our nationals, European countries tell surrogacy clinics” 
http://bit.ly/1wl2feK (accessed 8 July 2014). 
 123 Davis 2012 Minnesota J of Int L 129. 
 124 The medical visa requirements came into operation on 15 November 2012. On the visa 
requirements, see Malhotra and Malhotra International Survey 172; Crockin 2013 Repro-
ductive BioMedicine Online 738; Lin 2013 Cardozo J of Int and Comp L 563. 
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Children’s Act to insert a provision which expressly requires a thorough investi-
gation into whether foreign commissioning parents really do meet the domicile 
requirement. Detailed information in this regard should accompany the applica-
tion for confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement. However, even if 
the above amendment were to be introduced and strictly applied, the possibility 
of foreigners engaging in surrogacy in South Africa would not be excluded 
completely.  
Nor will South Africans who do not qualify for surrogacy in South Africa or 
do not want to engage in surrogacy here be deterred from going abroad to obtain 
a child via surrogacy. To ensure greater predictability and legal certainty regard-
ing the legal parentage of children in international surrogacy situations, the 
legislature should take the bull by the horns and expressly regulate the conse-
quences of the identified instances of international surrogacy. Shying away from 
this daunting task does not serve the best interests of children born from such 
surrogacy. 
